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REFLECTIONS UPON JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AS WE APPROACH THE
BICENTENNIAL OF MARBURY V. MADISON:
SAFEGUARDING THE CONSTITUTION'S
"CROWN JEWEL"
Honorable Gerald E. Rosen* and Kyle W. Harding**
I. INTRODUCTION
By 1787, the Revolution had been won and a new, independent
nation born.' But, the new nation had yet to clearly define a gov-
ernmental structure to maintain the principles over which the
Revolution was fought. Thus, when the fifty-five delegates to the
Constitutional Convention assembled in Philadelphia in May of
1787,2 they had the daunting task of fashioning a government that
would protect the ideals that sparked the birth of the United
States: freedom and the rule of law.
After five months of debate, controversy, and compromise, the
Framers emerged with a document that would prove the most en-
during constitution ever drafted. Shaped as much by the failure of
the Articles of Confederation as the experience of European gov-
ernments, 3 the United States Constitution creates a network of in-
stitutions to protect people against intrusive government and the
misappropriation of power by government leaders. One such insti-
tution unique to the American Constitution was the establishment
of a judiciary independent of both the legislative and the executive
branches. Chief Justice William Rehnquist has called the judicial
independence enjoyed by federal judges a "crown jewel" of our
Constitutional design.4
* Gerald E. Rosen is a United States District Judge for the Eastern District of
Michigan. He was appointed and confirmed in 1990.
** Kyle W. Harding is a senior at Kalamazoo College who interned with Judge
Rosen in 2001.
1. See JACK N. RAKOVE, THE BEGINNINGS OF NATIONAL POLITICS: AN INTER-
PRETIVE HISTORY OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 376 (1979).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., CHARLES GROVE HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 43-44 (1914).
4. See Linda Greenhouse, Rehnquist Joins Political Fray on Rulings, Defending
Judicial Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 1996, at A4 (quoting Chief Justice Wil-
liam H. Rehnquist).
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The independence of our federal judiciary unites two distinct
principles. The first, provided by Article III, protects federal
judges against diminished salary and provides for life tenure "dur-
ing good behaviour."5 In affording federal judges these protec-
tions, the Founders provided judges with decisional independence.
The second principle is the vesting of judicial power in a Supreme
Court and lower courts separate from the other branches of gov-
ernment.6 By making the third branch an effective check on the
legislative and executive branches, the Constitution provides the
judiciary with institutional independence. The Framers clearly un-
derstood the importance of separating the judicial branch from the
political branches of government.
While the Constitution laid the political foundation of judicial
independence, it remained for the Supreme Court itself to fully es-
tablish the role of the independent judiciary as a co-equal branch
of the government. The American Revolution was fought for the
freedom to live under a government chosen by the people, while
the Constitution-the bedrock of our polity-defines the limits on
government. In Marbury v. Madison,7 Chief Justice John Marshall
harmonized these two notions of self-government under a constitu-
tional rule of law. Thus, the Constitution-as our fundamental
law-is interpreted by an independent judiciary acting in relatively
rare circumstances to limit the power of the executive and legisla-
tive branches.
The importance of Marbury cannot be underestimated, as it is
the power of review that gives the courts the final authority to say
what the law is. But, without complete independence, the author-
ity for the power of review would be a meaningless illusion. Thus,
by shielding the courts from specific retaliation when they exercise
the power of review, the institutional and decisional independence
provided by the Constitution preserves the judiciary's authority to
exercise the power of review "without fear or favor."'8 However
these two linchpins of the third branch-independence and judicial
review-were not achieved without obstacle, and even after Mar-
bury, they have been challenged.
5. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
6. See id.
7. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
8. Prior to serving, many judges take an oath to, among other things, perform
their duties without fear or favor. See Pamela S. Karlan, Two Concepts of Judicial
Independence, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 535, 542 n.30 (1999).
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H. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE IN THE RATIFICATION DEBATE
Judicial independence was a point of great contention in the rati-
fication debate over the Constitution.9 In the aftermath of a
revolution fought over the right to establish a "government of the
people and by the people," opponents of Article III's ratification
feared that it consolidated too much power in an independent judi-
ciary, an "undemocratic" body removed from the people. 10 The
Federalists responded by highlighting the relative weakness of the
judiciary compared to the democratic branches. In Federalist No.
78, Alexander Hamilton commented:
The judiciary ... has no influence over either the sword or the
purse; no direction either of the strength or of the wealth of the
society; and can take no active resolution whatever. It may truly
be said to have neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judg-
ment; and must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive
arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.11
The Federalists argued that the legislature-the government in-
stitution subject to the fewest constraints-was more dangerous to
the people's freedom than the judiciary. 12 They reasoned that an
independent judiciary, confined by law, together with an energetic
executive, was necessary to balance the excessive power of the
legislature.13
The anti-Federalists did not necessarily oppose the Constitu-
tional safeguards that protected decisional independence. Thomas
Jefferson, an anti-Federalist and noted critic of the judiciary, never-
theless understood the importance of influence-free judges. The
Declaration of Independence, principally authored by Jefferson,
complains of colonial judges made subject to the King's will
alone.' 4 The anti-Federalists' main opposition to the Constitution's
ratification was that it afforded no means to balance judicial inde-
pendence with judicial accountability.' 5 Under the pen name
9. See HAINES, supra note 3, at 143.
10. See id. at 140.
11. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 227 (Alexander Hamilton) reprinted in THE FED-
ERALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2nd ed. 1966).
12. Id. See Edward J. Erler, Remarks at a Panel Sponsored by The Claremont
Institute (Sept. 3-6, 1998), http://www.claremont.org.
13. See Edward J. Erler, Remarks at a Panel sponsored by The Claremont Insti-
tute (Sept. 3-6, 1998), http://www.claremont.org.
14. See DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 14 (U.S. 1776).
15. CHARLES GARDNER GEYH, ABA COMM'N ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS
AND JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, THE ORIGIN AND His-
TORY OF FEDERAL JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE app. A (1997).
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"Brutus," an anti-Federalist wrote, "If ... the legislature pass any
laws inconsistent with the sense the judges put upon the constitu-
tion, they will declare it void; and therefore in this respect their
power is superior to that of the legislature."16
Jefferson, too, feared that the independence of judges would
lead to the gradual ascendance of the federal judiciary over the
other branches and the states. In 1821 in a letter to Charles Ham-
mond, he expressed his fears of a slow build-up of federal power:
It has long been my opinion, and I have not shrunk from its
expression ... that the germ of dissolution of our federal gov-
ernment is in the constitution of the Federal Judiciary; an irre-
sponsible body (for impeachment is scarcely a scare-crow),
working like gravity day and night, gaining a little to-day and a
little to-morrow, and advancing its noiseless step like a thief,
over the field of jurisdiction, until all shall be usurped from the
States, and the government of all shall be consolidated into
one.
17
The ratification debate highlights the issues underlying the con-
tentious nature of the establishment of an independent judiciary.
The fear of judicial oligarchy articulated by Brutus and Jefferson
two hundred years ago is still echoed today by talk show hosts,
politicians, and political pundits. In fact, they make a valid and
important point. While judicial independence allows judges the
freedom to interpret and follow the law, it also provides them pro-
tection if they do not.
III. MARBURY V. MADISON: THE JUDICIARY GAINS
Co-EQUAL STATUS
Many opponents of Article III believed their worst fears of judi-
cial supremacy were realized in Marbury v. Madison.8 William
Marbury, the justice of the peace in the District of Columbia, asked
the Supreme Court to issue a mandamus to Secretary of State
Madison, who, according to President Jefferson's request, had re-
16. Id. "Brutus" is believed to be Robert Yates, an anti-Federalist New York Su-
preme Court Judge, who was a delegate to the federal Constitutional Convention.
Anthony v. Baker, "So Extraordinary, So Unprecedented An Authority": A Concep-
tual Reconsideration of The Singular Doctrine of Judicial Review, 39 DuQ. L. REV.
729, 744 n.65 (2001).
17. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Charles Hammond (Aug. 18, 1821), in THE
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 330, 331-32 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert Ellery
Bergh eds., 1904).
18. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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fused to deliver a commission.19 Chief Justice Marshall wrote the
Court's unanimous opinion, in which he refused to order that the
commission be delivered, reasoning that the Court lacked the juris-
diction to do so (despite a 1789 congressional act that seemingly
authorized the Supreme Court to take such action).2 ° Marshall
held that the congressional act was in violation of the Constitution,
based on the power of judicial review, which he believed to be a
necessary component of limited government:
The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that
those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the Constitution
is written. To what purpose are powers limited, and to what
purpose is that limitation committed to writing, if these limits
may at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?
21
Marshall argued that there would be no reason for the Constitu-
tion to articulate any limits upon the legislature, if the legislature
could exceed those limits at its pleasure.22 Thus, the role of the
judiciary is to ensure that the actions of the other branches fall
within these constitutional limits. Central to this role is the judici-
ary's ability to exercise the power of review by striking down gov-
ernment actions that traverse the Constitution.
President Jefferson did not accept the Chief Justice's opinion as
final,23 and the Court did not invalidate an other act of Congress
until Dred Scott,24 fifty years later. Nevertheless, Marbury's doc-
trine of judicial review has become imbedded in American juris-
prudence.25 The independence of the judiciary, necessary to
effectuate power of review, however, has not gone unchallenged.
In fact, the Court's exercise of the power of review has at times
sparked retaliatory measures by the policy branches. In 1832, for
example, during Andrew Jackson's presidency, some states openly
defied Supreme Court decisions, and the president questioned
19. HAINES, supra note 3, at 168. The great irony in Marbury is that the commis-
sion in controversy was made out during the time Marshall was both the secretary of
state and Chief Justice, and therefore, responsible for the failure to deliver the com-
mission in the first place. Id.
20. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 175-80.
21. Id. at 176.
22. Id.
23. HAINES, supra note 3, at 171.
24. Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (119 How.) 393, 419-20 (1856) (holding that Dred
Scott, a slave, did not gain his freedom by being transferred into a U.S. territory that
was declared free by Congress because the law making the territory free was
unconstitutional).
25. HAINES, supra note 3, at 170-71.
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whether he had the power to enforce those decisions.2 6 He dis-
agreed with the Court's decision in a dispute between the Chero-
kee Tribe and the State of Georgia 27 and reputedly commented,
"John Marshall has made his decree, now let him enforce it."28
President Roosevelt was similarly annoyed with the Supreme
Court's rejection of his New Deal reforms29 and proposed aug-
menting the number of sitting justices in an effort to change the
ideological balance of that bench.3°
IV. JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE TODAY
The federal judiciary of today is not the judiciary of Hamilton's
Federalist No. 78. While the federal judiciary continues to depend
on the legislature for funding and on the executive to enforce its
decisions, as Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas has said,
"What is truly surprising about today's judiciary is how strong it
really is."'31 Justice Thomas continued:
Long past are the days when President Lincoln might make the
argument that the Court's decisions bind only the parties before
it. No one is suggesting, as President Jefferson and Jackson did,
that the Court's decisions should be ignored or remain unen-
forced. No one has suggested altering the number of seats or
the composition of the Supreme Court to alter its decisions....
If anything, the judiciary's authority in our society is at its
peak.32
An independent, unelected judiciary that has the final say on the
constitutionality of law is a substantial check on the legislative and
executive branches. Such a judiciary is an independent safeguard
against the "tyranny of the majority '3 3 and trampling of legitimate
26. Barry Friedman, Attacks on Judges: Why They Fail, 81 JUDICATURE 150, 153
(1998).
27. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 562-63 (1832) (overturning a state
court ruling sentencing Samuel A. Worcester to four years. Because the crimes were
committed in what was then the Cherokee nation, a separate nation under the
Hopewell Treaty, the case was beyond the jurisdiction of the state court).
28. Friedman, supra note 26, at 153.
29. See Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 314-17 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter
Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 550 (1935).
30. Friedman, supra note 26, at 152.
31. Honorable Clarence Thomas, Remarks at the Federalist Society National Con-
vention, Annual Lawyer's Banquet (Nov. 12, 1999), http://www.fed-soc.org/Publica-
tions/Transcripts/justicethomas.htm.
32. Id.
33. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 16-23 (James Madison) reprinted in THE FEDER-
ALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2nd ed. 1966).
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minority rights. Still, concerns remain over the potential usurping
of policy-making authority by the unelected judiciary.34 Just as
Congress and the president have a duty to respect the indepen-
dence of the courts, the privilege of independence carries recipro-
cal obligations upon the judiciary. Federal judges must understand
the need for institutional respect and restraint.
The Constitution has been, and continues to be, criticized for not
balancing judicial independence with judicial accountability.3
Still, federal judges are accountable to the people. While the guar-
antees of life tenure and protection against salary diminishment
shield judges from political pressure, these guarantees will only ex-
ist as long as the majority accepts the system that provides them.
By insulating judges from political and public pressure, judicial in-
dependence affords courts the freedom to decide cases based on
the law. Judges must abide by the institutional constraints inherent
in a democratic society or risk losing that independence.
The responsibility of protecting this crown jewel belongs to fed-
eral judges and their ability to decide cases impartially in accor-
dance with the law. Many factors exist which challenge a judge's
ability to do so. Defining these threats and describing how judges
can follow the law in their wake will be the focus of the balance of
this essay.
V. PUBLIC AND POLITICAL PRESSURE ON THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY
In Federalist 78, Alexander Hamilton wrote, "It would require
an uncommon portion of fortitude in the judges to do their duty as
faithful guardians of the Constitution, where legislative invasions
of it had been instigated by the major voice of the community."36
As Justice Thomas has stated, this point is rarely stressed enough.37
Judges make a lifetime commitment to public service when they
leave the lucrative private sector for the federal bench. Such sacri-
fice deserves the public's appreciation and understanding. How-
34. See, e.g., Edwin Meese III, Putting the Judiciary Back on the Constitutional
Track, 14 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 781-82 (1998) (suggesting ways in which Congress
can limit judicial activism).
35. Charles Gardner Geyh & Emily Field Van Tassel, The Independence of the
Judicial Branch in the New Republic, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 31, 32 (1998).
36. Clarence Thomas, Be Not Afraid, 12 AM. ENTERPRISE 44, 44-45 (2001) (quot-
ing THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton) reprinted in THE FEDER-
ALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2nd ed. 1966).
37. Id.
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ever, this does not mean judges should get a free pass from media
and public scrutiny. Indeed, they never have. From the Jefferso-
nian assault on the Federalist judiciary38 to public backlash stem-
ming from the Court's recent abortion and election decisions,39 the
history of the judiciary has been one punctuated by controversy.
The fact that our judiciary has survived two centuries of chal-
lenges to its independence is a reflection of the institution's impor-
tance in our system of government. Although judges, by and large,
possess a high level of intellectual and legal ability, they are fallible
and their opinions are susceptible to political influences.
Rare is the national news program or newspaper that does not
take public opinion polls, or the politician who stumps without cit-
ing polling data supporting his or her campaign proposals. In the
political arena, public opinion has become an unparalleled agenda-
setting agent. Thanks to professional pollsters and the mass media,
policy-makers are able to access and respond to public opinion on
a daily basis. Given this prevalence, it is entirely understandable,
and perhaps even appropriate, that our elected representatives
should be affected by polling data. Politicians have a responsibility
to represent their constituency, and their tenure may ultimately de-
pend on how faithfully they represent their constituents' views.
However, genuflecting before polling data is not-and must not
be-part of a judge's job description. The federal judiciary was not
intended to be a representative branch of government.4 0 The role
of the judiciary is to protect against majority excess when that ex-
cess violates fundamental liberties.41 A judge need not give
credence to a legal argument simply because it is supported by
public opinion. In fact, if a popular law clearly contradicts consti-
tutional freedoms, the Court has a duty to strike it down.
This is not to say that fulfillment of that duty is not without risk
to the judicial institution (or, for that matter, to an individual
judge). History demonstrates that in striking down popular laws,
the judiciary exposes itself to backlash from both the people and
38. See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text.
39. See generally Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 120-23 (2000) (reversing and remand-
ing a Florida Supreme Court decision ordering a manual recount of ballots in the 2000
presidential election and effectively ending the election); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
153-60 (1973) (holding unconstitutional a Texas statute prohibiting abortions at any
stage of pregnancy except to save the life of the mother).
40. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 226-33 (Alexander Hamilton) reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION




the political branches.42 One example of this, discussed above, was
President Jackson's resolve not to enforce Supreme Court deci-
sions that he did not agree with.43
While Jackson's defiance of the Court was notable in its pithi-
ness, his attack against the judiciary was not the most direct
launched by a sitting president. That dubious distinction belongs to
President Franklin Roosevelt and his infamous court-packing
plan." By 1937, President Roosevelt had grown impatient with the
Supreme Court." Just one year earlier, he had been overwhelm-
ingly re-elected.46 Yet after key elements of his New Deal program
suffered defeat in the Supreme Court,47 his legislative mandate was
in danger of being undone by the courts.48 As public anti-judicial
sentiment escalated, many critics began to question the Court's
power of judicial review.4 9 President Roosevelt entered the fray by
launching his plan for "judicial reform," forever known as his
court-packing plan.5" Roosevelt's reasons for attempting to in-
crease the number of Justices were purely ideological.51 In a "fire-
side chat" on March 9, 1937, the President delivered the following
criticism of the judiciary:
Last Thursday I described the American form of government as
a three-horse team provided by the Constitution to the Ameri-
can people so that their field might be plowed. The three horses
are, of course, the three branches of government-the Congress,
the executive, and the courts. Two of the horses are pulling in
unison today; the third is not.52
In attempting to pack the Supreme Court, the politically well-
attuned president hit an uncharacteristic false note. Roosevelt's ef-
forts to change the composition of the Court resulted in public out-
42. See, e.g., JACK BASS, TAMING THE STORM 124-26 (1993) (discussing the vio-
lence surrounding the desegregation and civil rights cases, including a bomb being
detonated outside the home of Judge Frank M. Johnson, Jr. following a district court
ruling).
43. See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
44. See Stephen B. Burbank, The Architecture of Judicial Independence, 72 S. CAL.
L. REV. 315, 322-23 (1999) (discussing the effect of Roosevelt's court packing plan).
45. Friedman, supra note 26, at 152.
46. Id. at 154.




51. Id. at 152 (describing how Roosevelt justified the attempt in terms of reducing
the sitting Justices' workload and increasing judicial efficiency).
52. Id.
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rage and, ultimately led to the failure of his reform plan.53 Though
his plan failed, Roosevelt arguably did succeed in moving the
Court. Following the court-packing debacle, the Supreme Court
upheld several legislative programs nearly identical to those it had
previously stricken.54
Congress too, has responded to perceived excesses by the judici-
ary. In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act in an
effort to reign in judges whom they felt were too lenient in sentenc-
ing. The resulting system employed today allows judges far less
discretion in sentencing by imposing guidelines for sentencing and
mandatory minimum sentences.
When the political branches perceive the judiciary as overstep-
ping its role, the response may be directed at the governance of the
judiciary itself. Just this year, legislation was introduced in the Sen-
ate requiring that seminars attended by judges be pre-approved
and funded by the Federal Judicial Center under a pre-set congres-
sional formula. 7 The stated goal of this legislation is to limit
judges' attendance to "seminars that are conducted in a manner so
as to maintain the public's confidence in an unbiased and fair-
minded judiciary. ,58 Currently, federal judges must already file an-
nual disclosure reports of all "non-case" related travel, including
information related to reimbursement of expenses. 5 9 These reports
are, as they should be, available for public scrutiny. 60
However, the judicial independence concerns raised by the pre-
approved seminar requirement and the accompanying prohibition
of attendance at seminars funded by non-government sources
trump any public good that would derive from them. In opposing
this legislation, Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the Federal
53. Id. at 154.
54. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (uphold-
ing the National Labor Relations Act as a proper exercise of Congress's power to
regulate interstate commerce); W. Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 396 (1937)
(finding no due process violation in recognizing a state's interest in protecting female
employees through a minimum wage act).
55. The Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (1984).
56. 28 U.S.C. § 994 (1994). See Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 363-65 (1989)
(describing the intended effect of the Act on sentencing).
57. S. 2990, 106th Cong. (2000), legislation introduced by senators John F. Kerry
(D-MA) and Russell D. Feingold (D-WI). See also Chief Justice Supports Judges' Ed-
ucation, 33 THE THIRD BRANCH (Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, Washing-
ton D.C.), June 2001, at 1, 6, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/June01.html (discussing the
proposal).
58. S. 2990, 106th Cong. (2000).




Judges Association have argued that to bar federal judges from
participation in non-governmental seminars is a congressionally-
imposed limit on judicial education. 61 Congress's attempt to regu-
late the information content and viewpoints presented to the fed-
eral judiciary is a serious violation of the institutional separation of
the branches.
Even more radical incursions upon the independence of the
courts have been proposed by Congress in recent years. The 105th
Congress, for example, proposed an amendment to the Constitu-
tion which provided for the reconfirmation of federal judges by the
Senate every twelve years.6 2 Other attempts by the political
branches to assert control over federal courts, including creating
term limits for judges, have surfaced periodically in, recent years.63
These examples illustrate another aspect of judicial indepen-
dence, what the Chief Justice has called the paradox of judicial in-
dependence.64 While sitting federal judges enjoy tenure during
good behavior and non-diminishable salaries, the Senate has the
ultimate confirmation authority. Only Congress can create new
federal judgeships, appropriate money for the judiciary's budget,
and to a certain extent, determine the procedures judges must fol-
low. Perhaps most tellingly, Congress holds the power of the purse
over judicial compensation.65 Although it cannot diminish judicial
compensation, it can disapprove judicial pay raises, including cost-
of living increases.66 This irony prompted the Chief Justice to com-
ment, "We have as independent a judiciary as I know of in any
democracy, and yet the judges are very much dependent on the
61. Id. at 2.
62. H.R. 63, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Congressman Paxon (R-NY)).
63. See, e.g., H.R. 74, 105th Cong. (1997) (introduced by Congressman Riggs (R-
CA); proposing an amendment to the Constitution that would have provided for
eight-year terms of office for federal judges other than Supreme Court Justices).
64. ABA COMM'N ON THE SEPARATION OF POWERS AND JUDICIAL INDEPEN-
DENCE, AN INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY, THE ORIGIN AND HISTORY OF FEDERAL JUDI-
CIAL INDEPENDENCE 3 (1997).
65. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
66. This aspect of congressional leverage is so fraught with institutional tension
that a prominent group of sitting judges has brought a class action against the govern-
ment under Article III's compensation clause over Congress's failure to provide cost-
of-living increases to judges over the past decade as allegedly required under the Eth-
ics Reform Act of 1989, 5 U.S.C. § 5318 (2001). The judges prevailed in the federal
district court, see Williams v. U.S., 48 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 1999), but lost in a split
vote before the court of appeals, see Williams v. U.S., 240 F.3d 1019 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
Petition for certiorari is currently pending in the Supreme Court.
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legislature and executive for the enactment of laws to enable the
judges to do a better job of administering justice."67
VI. SELECTION AND CONFIRMATION OF JUDGES
In addition to direct administrative interaction with the judiciary,
the political branches make their presence felt during the appoint-
ment and confirmation process. While the independence of the ju-
diciary requires strict neutrality of judges, the policy branches are
partisan institutions and their members are free to advocate policy.
Although judicial independence insulates the judiciary from the ex-
ecutive and the legislature, all three branches intersect at the nomi-
nation and confirmation process, resulting in the potential for
political influence upon judicial decisions.
To enter and advance within the federal judiciary, judges are de-
pendent upon partisan politicians, who weigh political considera-
tions heavily in the selection and confirmation process.
In a perfect world, this intersection of the political and judicial
institutions would be limited to evaluating the professional qualifi-
cations and character of judicial candidates, with perhaps only a
passing inquiry into the candidate's jurisprudential philosophy.
When Justice Thomas met with President Bush in 1991, the presi-
dent's only inquiry for the potential Supreme Court Justice was
whether Thomas "could call it as he saw it" when he became a
member of the Court.68 "In a perfect world," Justice Thomas com-
mented, that question "would be the only one members of the
Court should ever have to answer, either to a president or to the
legislators that confirm their appointments. ' 69 Justice Thomas's
comment is deliberately ironic, for his own volatile confirmation
experience highlights the degree to which the nomination and con-
firmation of federal judges has become anything but a clean merits
review. 70 That a nominee must be willing to endure a very public-
67. William H. Rehnquist, Remarks at Washington College of Law of American
University (Apr. 9, 1996), http://supct.law.cornell.edu/aupct/ustices/rehnav96.htm.
68. Clarence Thomas, Remarks at Francis Boyer Lecture, American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (Feb. 13, 2001), http://www.aei.org/boyer/Thomas.
htm. We are confident that President Bush's question referred to whether Justice
Thomas could follow the law as best he could derive it, and that is how Justice
Thomas understood it.
69. Id.
70. See, e.g., William Schneider, Engagement vs. Isolation: A Nation of Defiant
Optimists, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 28, 2001, at M6 (discussing the complacency of Americans
and their obsession with outlandish events in the 1990s, beginning with the confirma-
tion hearings of Clarence Thomas).
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and very partisan-confirmation process seems an unavoidable re-
sult of our highly polarized society.
Judges can be highly sensitive to this. The ambition to become a
judge, which helps in traveling the difficult road to the federal
bench, does not always subside upon confirmation. The role ambi-
tion plays in judicial decision-making is not frequently discussed,
but is relevant when analyzing potential threats to judicial indepen-
dence. The vast majority of men and women on the federal bench
respect the important public service they provide and strive might-
ily to be true to their oath of impartiality. But, while a federal
judgeship may be the capstone of a notable legal career, some may
aspire to higher rungs-whether that be service on a higher court,
the attainment of a different office, or otherwise. For those judges,
the chance of undermining their further advancement in the judici-
ary by decisions which may offend appointing or confirming au-
thorities can-given today's poisoned partisan atmosphere-loom
large over the decisional process. Sometimes it can require ex-
traordinary effort to set aside such considerations.
VII. PERSONAL PmLOSOPHY OF JUDGES
The Constitution envisions the judiciary as a guard against the
transitory will of the people, when that will violates Constitutional
freedoms. This principle of judicial review is as important today as
when the Founders penned it. Still, the Founders did not consider
themselves to be creating a judicial government. Rather, the Con-
stitution was drafted to create a limited self-government. It follows
that for the people to truly rule in spite of the independent judici-
ary, judges must themselves remain ever cognizant of their limited
governmental role.
When federal judges substitute their own policy views for those
in the Constitution, or attempt to write their own philosophy into
law, the invariable result is that the people lose legislative author-
ity, and with it, their self-government. Unwarranted judicial forays
into the policy arena unavoidably lead to a situation in which
judges jeopardize the very rights the Constitution expects them to
protect. As Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah aptly questioned, when
judges do not follow the law, who guards the guardians?7"
The simple answer to Senator Hatch's rhetorical question is the
Constitution. Our legal system is based on the precept that we are
71. Hatch Fires Warning Shot on Judges, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 18, 1996, at 14.
2002]
804 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XXIX
a government of laws and not men.72 Judicial discretion is con-
strained, not only by the Constitution, but also by the legislature
and the executive, the authority of higher courts, and the eviden-
tiary record. Without such constraints, the law would become only
that which any judge, or panel of judges, believes it should be.
In drafting the Constitution, the Framers did not wish to con-
strain future generations by the beliefs they held. Therefore, they
provided an amendment process in the Constitution. Yet, the
strength of the Constitution is not that its provisions can be
amended, but that its core principles are indelible. As Hamilton
wrote in Federalist No. 78:
.. in questioning that fundamental principle of republican gov-
ernment, which admits the right of the people to alter or abolish
the established Constitution whenever they find it inconsistent
with their happiness; yet it is not to be inferred from this princi-
ple that the representatives of the people, whenever a momen-
tary inclination happens to lay a hold of a majority of their
constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing
Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation
of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater
obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, then when they
had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative
body.73
Hamilton's reasoning is persuasive, for if the principles of the
Constitution were ultimately subservient to the legislature, our
constitutional rights would cease to exist without the approval of a
prevalent majority.
While the problems our society encounters today are vastly dif-
ferent from the experiences of these first Americans, the principles
of limited self-government, natural rights, and freedoms are as ap-
plicable today when the Constitution was signed. Although these
principles have never been fully realized and, no doubt, never will
be, they constitute our nation's lodestar. A society that allows
freedom and self-determination cannot address every instance of
injustice. It is not, and cannot be, the role of the judiciary to right
72. John Adams, writing in the Boston Gazette, attributed the phrase a 'govern-
ment of laws and not of men' to James Harrington, an English political theorist. 1
THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 336 (Philip B Kurland & Ralph Kerner eds., 1987).
More to our purposes, John Marshall appropriated the phrase in Marbury v. Madison,
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803).
73. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in THE FED-
ERALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2nd ed. 1966).
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every perceived wrong, or to discover new rights that are being
violated in the Constitution. Instead, the Constitution requires
judges to apply the principles of the Constitution to each particular
case, without substituting their own philosophy for the Constitu-
tion itself. A conversation between Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
and Judge Learned Hand, two of the greatest legal figures of the
twentieth century, epitomizes this point.74 After having lunch to-
gether one day, Hand bid Holmes farewell, saying, "Do justice sir,
do justice. ' 75 To which Holmes, a great advocate of judicial re-
straint, replied, "That is not my job. It is my job to apply the
law."
76
In recent years, criticism of judges "doing justice"-writing their
own philosophical biases into the law-has been encompassed
under the broad rubric of judicial activism. But, this characteriza-
tion of activism is misleading. As Professor Edward Erler has
noted:
A viable theory of constitutional jurisprudence cannot be built
merely upon opposition to judicial activism. Rather, the proper
question is whether the court is pursuing constitutional princi-
ples-sometimes this requires activism and sometimes restraint.
A court that was passive in the face of constitutional violations
by Congress would be remiss in its constitutional duties. 77
The so-called judicial activism of judges in the South who de-
cided the school desegregation cases is such an example. In this
challenging chapter of our history, judicial decisions regarding de-
segregation and civil rights were met with opposition and hostil-
ity.78 Some of the judges who made these decisions faced
tremendous strain in their communities.79 They were ostracized so-
cially and routinely threatened due to what was misperceived as
unwarranted judicial activism. 80 Yet, in the face of this public
backlash, many judges retained their impartiality and advocated
74. ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION
OF THE LAW 6 (1990).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Edward J. Erler, Remarks at a Panel Sponsored by The Claremont Institute
(Sept. 3-6, 1998), http://www.claremont.org,
78. See, e.g., BAss, supra note 42, at 124-26.
79. See, e.g., id.
80. See, e.g., id.
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the constitutional principles that had not yet been expressed in so-
ciety or law.81
The Constitution is clearly silent on certain issues, and though it
may not speak directly to a legal issue, it still provides the princi-
ples judges must use when deciding cases that pose those difficult
questions. It is with respect to these cases, with issues that venture
into uncharted constitutional waters, that judges are especially sus-
ceptible to their own notions of morality. As Judge Bork has
stated, "Courts have become quite adept at disguising their own
moral judgments as mere obedience to law."'82
While constitutional jurisprudence is replete with accusations of
judicial legislating, two important cases are often cited examples of
unwarranted activism. In Lochner v. New York,83 the Supreme
Court invalidated a state law that prohibited the employment of
bakery workers more than ten hours per day and sixty hours per
week.84 The New York legislature had passed the statute to protect
the health of bakers, in response to the incidence of lung problems
that coincided with long periods of breathing in flour. Despite
the apparent health risk the law addressed, the Court held that reg-
ulating bakery workers hours violated a "right of contract" be-
tween the employer and employee. 86 Although the Constitution
says nothing about a "right of contract," the majority ruled that
such a right was implied in the Fourteenth Amendment's substan-
tive due process clause.87 Lochner represents the Court's decision
to enlist on one side of an economic debate-the side of laissez-
faire capitalism.
At the other end of the spectrum is Griswold v. Connecticut,88
wherein the Fourteenth Amendment was again the source for a
substantive due process right.89 In Griswold, the Court struck
down a law that made the use of contraceptives illegal, even by
married couples.90 The Court's majority held that the 1879 statute
violated a constitutional "right to privacy," finding it antiquated
81. See generally id. (describing Judge Johnson's perseverance in the face of vio-
lence and threats).
82. Robert H. Bork, Activist Judges Strike Again, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22, 1999, at
A8.
83. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
84. Id. at 64.
85. Id. at 69-70 (Harlan, White, and Day, J.J., dissenting).
86. Id. at 59.
87. Id. at 53.
88. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
89. Id. at 481-82.
90. Id. at 485.
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and arcane. 91 Justice Stewart dissented and elaborated on his view
of a judge's proper role in such circumstances:
I think this is an uncommonly silly law. As a practical matter,
the law is obviously unenforceable .... As a philosophical mat-
ter, I believe the use of contraceptives in the relationship of
marriage should be left to personal and private choice .... As a
matter of social policy, I think professional counsel about meth-
ods of birth control should be available to all, so that each indi-
vidual's choice can be meaningfully made. But we are not asked
in this case whether we think this law is unwise, or even asinine.
We are asked to hold that it violates the United States Constitu-
tion. And that I cannot do.92
Justice Hugo Black, by joining Justice Stewart and dissenting in
Griswold, may have stunned and even disappointed some of his
greatest admirers. As a result of his absolutist interpretation of the
First Amendment, the aging Justice was widely regarded as one of
the Court's most prominent liberal voices. However, Black's dis-
sent contains a strong denunciation of the majority's discovery of a
new "right to privacy" in the Constitution: "Use of any such broad,
unbounded judicial authority would make [this Court's] members a
day-to-day constitutional convention. ' 93
Some judges undoubtedly believe that a judge's proper role is to
modify the Constitution as society changes. Those who believe
that the Constitution is a "living document" would empower judges
to decide what new rights exist and determine where they are
found in the Constitution. This would be a judicial oligarchy fully
realized. Of course, this begs the question: If rights do exist in the
shadows and folds of our Constitution, and we are a government of
the people, why should unelected judges enjoy the privilege of dis-
covering such rights instead of the people or their elected repre-
sentatives? Justice Scalia once quipped, "What secret knowledge,
one must wonder, is breathed into lawyers when they become Jus-
tices of this Court?"1' 94
Criticism of the judiciary comes from all sides of the political
spectrum, and those who would defend the decisions in Griswold
and Lochner are certainly entitled to do so. Judges must always be
mindful that, in seeking the lofty goal of influence-free judging, the
91. Id. at 485-86.
92. Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 520 (Black, J., dissenting).
94. Robert H Bork, Our Judicial Oligarchy, FIRST THINGS, Nov. 1996, at 26, http:/
/www.firstthings.com/ftissues/ft9611/articles/bork.html.
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judiciary particularly opens itself to such criticism. Ultimately,
when judges become policymakers, the institutional distinctions be-
tween the policy branches and the judiciary blur in the public mind.
The protections of decisional and institutional independence pro-
vided by the Constitution are invariably put in jeopardy, as the
people increasingly see the judiciary as just another political insti-
tution-and begin to wonder why judges should not be treated
accordingly.
VIH. THE CHALLENGE OF JUDGING
A judge's duty to render decisions in accordance with the law
presents a great challenge, and the contentious environment in
which judges must fulfill this duty only adds to the challenge. Ob-
viously, the first part of this challenge is often trying to figure out
what the law is. Many cases that come before the court present
complex and subtle legal issues concealed within each other like
Russian nesting dolls. These cases create an intellectual strain, but
do not threaten the independence of the judiciary.
It is the second part of the challenge that tests the impartiality of
judges. After determining, as best he or she can, what the law ne-
cessitates, a judge must then follow that decision through. The
cases in which that result is not consistent with a judge's personal
view of what is "just" or "fair" are the ones that present a judge's
greatest challenge. Following the law requires self-discipline on
the part of judges to resist the temptation to bend the law to reach
a "just" result. The judiciary demands fortitude of its members, as
Hamilton wrote, to withstand the Scourge of popular criticism and
to combat personal bias and ambition.95
All too often, judicial restraint is cast as a "school" of constitu-
tional interpretation, as if it were one choice on a menu. To the
contrary, minimizing judicial policy-making is the cornerstone of
an independent judiciary. It is a rare case in which the Constitu-
tion or settled precedent offer little advice or direction. Judges
should not search for ambiguity as a ruse to mask a policy agenda.
Such jurisprudential adventures do not serve "justice"; they pro-
mote disrespect for the judiciary and undermine the institution's
penultimate mission of deciding cases and rendering justice under
the law.
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 231 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in THE FED-
ERALIST PAPERS: A COLLECTION OF ESSAYS IN SUPPORT OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE UNITED STATES (Roy P. Fairfield ed., 2nd ed. 1966).
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The approaching bicentennial of Marbury v. Madison96 reminds
us that judicial restraint is not a school of jurisprudence, but a vital
component to judicial independence. By fulfilling the limited role
the Constitution envisions for the judiciary, federal judges ensure
that the authority over uncharted legal or cultural issues is reserved
to the executive and legislature branches, and ultimately the peo-
ple, as our Founders intended. Although courts retain the power
of judicial review, when the policy branches' actions truly offend
the Constitution, the people need not surrender their sovereignty
over important societal questions to federal judges, and the proper
balance between the judiciary and the political branches can be
maintained.
Nevertheless, the jurisprudence of restraint is exercised within a
broad spectrum. At one end are judges who feel the Constitution
is elastic and must adapt to changes in society, at the other are
judges endeavoring to limit their role'to the strict application of the
literal language of the Constitution. Unfortunately, this continuum
roughly parallels our political spectrum. A highly partisan selection
and confirmation process is the result, and will undoubtedly
continue.
Herein lies perhaps the greatest threat to judicial independence.
Although partisan politics have always played a role in the selec-
tion and confirmation of judges, partisanship is no longer limited to
pressure by one political party or another. Rather, the rise of sin-
gle, or special, interest groups on both sides of the political divide
has an enormous influence on the selection and confirmation of
judges. Because these special interest groups are often orientated
around a specific group of issues, these issues create a crucible
through which judicial candidates must pass. A judicial candidate
must withstand the political pressure of interest groups who re-
search and react against the policy results of decisions a candidate
has rendered, or on which the candidate has written or spoken.
Although the political players resist the claim that they use these
issues as a "litmus test," there is no question that, if these groups
do not have absolute veto power over every candidate, they sub-
stantially influence the selection and confirmation process. Nomi-
nees or prospective nominees can be discarded on the basis of a
single decision or even a single written statement.
For judicial candidates who are already sitting judges, this is
enormously threatening to their independence in judging. If candi-
96. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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dates are evaluated on the basis of a very narrow range of their
prior rulings, then the judiciary ceases to be separate from the po-
litical branches.
The danger posed by the intrusion of special interest groups into
the judicial selection and confirmation process is not simply that
these groups will influence who sits on the federal bench and who
does not, but that their influence will ultimately infect the very de-
cision-making process of judging itself. Although judges strive to
remain outside of politics once on the bench, they are acutely
aware of the political winds that swirl around them, particularly
since most had some political experience prior to becoming judges.
Once judges realize that they will be evaluated based upon the pol-
icy outcomes of one or two of their decisions, there is a real threat
that, even subconsciously, this will chill their ability to follow the
law strictly. This is especially true where he or she might not like
the result. This is not simply a minor factor; because these issues
often present close questions of constitutional or statutory con-
struction, the presence of this factor can cause a judge to "hear
footsteps" before rendering a decision. Thus, these groups-who
often celebrate and proclaim victory if they have "killed" a selec-
tion or nomination-can effectively intimidate judges. This is the
end of judicial independence.
As easy as it is to state the problem, the tension between the
judiciary and the political branches is not easily resolved. The
Constitution provides the third branch with a bulwark to protect
the rights of the minority. Politicians however, clearly have a stake
in implementing majority viewpoints and protecting against judicial
excess. The historical clashes between our governmental
branches-from President Jackson's refusal to enforce certain
Marshall Court decisions to President Roosevelt's attempt to pack
the Court-were, to a great degree, born of these conflicting
constituencies.
This potential for conflict must not thwart judges from fulfilling
their Constitutional obligations. Judges must be vigilant not to ex-
ceed their assigned role in the constitutional structure and unduly
agitate political branches to the point where they must respond to
judicial excess. In this governmental system of overlapping author-
ity, judges must always be able to decide their cases "without fear
or favor," even when that may upset the established political au-
thority. This is the value of judicial independence: protecting the
ability of judges to follow the law, even in the vortex of political
tension.
810
